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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
"[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon
millions of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take
their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s.
Indeed, more than a case, this is a saga .... "I
I. INTRODUCTION
Mass tort litigation has risen exponentially in the last twenty years.2
Recent cases provide a number of examples: a class of over one million
women with injury-causing breast implants, 3 a class of owners of Ford-
made all-terrain vehicles that flip-over, 4 a class of owners of GM pickups
with exploding gas tanks5 and a class of people, possibly in the millions,
exposed to asbestos. 6 These cases are controversial because they involve
devastating injuries-often death-and enormous sums of money. 7 The
cases mentioned above were all brought as class actions under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the advisory committee
notes to Rule 23 state that mass torts are not appropriate for class actions
because significant factual and legal questions may affect individuals in
different ways.8 District courts have seemingly ignored the advice of the
* 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
1 Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617-618 (3d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos 1-3
(1991)), aft'd, Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
2 See MARK A. PEMsON & MOLLY SELViu, RESOLUTION OF MAss TORTS:
TOWARD A FRAmEWORK FOR EvALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PaocEDURES 6 (1988).
3 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-
S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
4 See In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., CIV. A. MDL-991,
1995 WL 222177, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1995).
5 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 769 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
6 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2234 (1997).
7 See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 837, 837 (1995).
8 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT rET AL., FEDERAL PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 1783
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advisory committee and used Rule 23 for resolution of mass torts. 9
Currently, a Rule 23 class action is a better option than individual suits
for resolution of mass tort claims. Individual suits pose a number problems:
individual suits are costly in time and money and often exceed the victim's
recovery; they frequently end with inconsistent judgments and individual
suits severely burden court dockets. 10 Congress has yet to create an
administrative system by which injured parties in mass tort cases may
receive compensation. A variety of different commentators have offered
their suggestions on alternative methods to resolve mass tort claims. These
ideas include: (1) modification of procedural rules, 11 (2) reordering priority
claims,12 (3) removal of mass tort claims from the tort system altogether13
and (4) use of settlement-only class actions.
Recently, district courts have been open to settlement-only class actions
for resolution of mass tort claims.14 However, Rule 23 itself has no specific
provisions on settlement. Arguably, district court judges have stretched
Rule 23 beyond its intended use. Although not technically sanctioned under
Rule 23, settlement-only class actions provide a number of benefits for
injured parties, for courts and for defending parties, including, inter alia, a
quick remedy for injured parties, low transaction costs and relief for court
dockets loaded with mass tort filings.' 5 Nevertheless, settlement-only class
actions have a number of negative aspects. Many settlement-only class
(1990).
9 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d at 769; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1428
(2d. Cir. 1993); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL 222177,
at *1; In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353, at *1.
10 See Roger C. Cramaton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement
Class Actions"; An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 813-817 (1995).
11 See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tsx. L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1986).
12 See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in
Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 542 (1992).
13 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics
Litigation, 98 YALE L.J. 813, 827 (1989).
14 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d at 768; In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco I Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL
222177, at *1; In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353,
at *1.
15 See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
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actions bind future plaintiffs to the agreement, including those plaintiffs
who have yet to file a suit and those who have yet to recognize any
injury. 16 Therefore, parties, who at the time of the settlement have no
interest in the terms of the settlement, are forced years later to take the
terms of the agreement or get nothing. 17 Furthermore, giving notice of the
class action settlement to future plaintiffs who have not developed injury
borders on the impossible. In addition, the attorneys who represent parties
in pending litigation are often the same attorneys filing the settlement-only
class action on behalf of future plaintiffs. 18 Thus, attorneys settle their
existing cases for huge amounts and then bind absent, future plaintiffs for
eternity to an administrative mechanism that has caps on damage
recoveries. 19 A dilemma exists. Should district courts extend Rule 23 to
authorize settlement-only class actions in order to promote efficiency and
claims resolution? Or, should district courts force injured parties to sue and
settle separately despite long delays, high transaction costs and the possible
bankruptcy of defending parties?
This Note focuses on Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,20 which
involved a settlement-only class action between certain asbestos makers and
people exposed to asbestos-related products but who had not yet filed any
lawsuit. To put the asbestos problem into perspective, a United States
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation appointed
by Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted that asbestos-related diseases will
result in as many as 265,000 deaths by the year 2015.21 Asbestos-related
illnesses have led to numerous filings of asbestos-related claims in federal
and state courts across the United States. If the predictions about asbestos-
related diseases and deaths are anywhere near accurate, even more lawsuits
will be filed in the future.
In addition to heavy court dockets, asbestos litigation, as most mass tort
litigation, presents a plethora of troublesome issues for parties to the
lawsuit. Some of the objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation include:
long delays before trial, lengthy trials, repetitive litigation over similar
16 See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 2239.
20 117 S. Ct. 2231.
21 See id. (citing Report of the Judicial Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation
2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
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issues, inconsistency in verdicts, high transaction costs that exceed victims'
recovery and depletion of defendants' assets, which preclude future
plaintiffs from any recovery. 22 Although numerous calls have been made
for legislative action for an asbestos-claim administrative mechanism, to
date Congress has failed to remedy the situation.23 In the face of legislative
inaction, the federal district courts have endeavored, unsuccessfully, to
improve asbestos-related litigation by certifying settlement-only class
actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24
II. FACTS
In Amchem Products, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Third Circuit's decision to vacate and remand with directions to decertify a
global class settlement between persons exposed to asbestos and asbestos
products manufacturers who were members of the Center for Claims
Resolution (CCR).25 Amchem Products, Inc. represented one of about
twenty of the CCR members. 26 The proposed settlement was initiated after
a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation27 consolidated in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania all personal injury asbestos lawsuits then pending
in the federal courts for pre-trial discovery and settlement talks. 2s After
consolidation of the lawsuits, the CCR defendants' and plaintiffs' attorneys
began negotiations. 29 The CCR defendants agreed to settle all claims then
22 See id. at 2-3.
23 See id.
24 See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716, 722 (E.D. Pa.
1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); see also In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d
963, 974 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
25 See id. at 2252. Members of the CCR represent some of the most solvent
asbestos product manufacturers. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the
Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159,
1163 (1995).
26 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2238 n.2.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1407 permits a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
consolidate in one federal district civil actions involving one or more common questions
of fact that are pending in different districts for purposes of coordinated or consolidated
pre-trial proceedings. See id.
28 See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257 (E.D. Pa.
1994), order vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
29 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2238.
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pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania so long as the CCR
defendants would be protected in the future against potential plaintiffs who
had not yet filed lawsuits. 30 After plaintiffs' attorneys and the CCR
defendants reached an agreement, the CCR defendants' and plaintiffs'
attorneys settled all then-pending lawsuits. 31 Thereafter, in a pre-packaged
deal, the CCR defendants' and the same plaintiffs' attorneys attempted to
settle all future asbestos claims. The two parties filed a class action
complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement agreement and a joint motion
for conditional class certification all in the same day. 32 The complaint
identified a class comprised of all persons who had not previously sued any
of the CCR asbestos manufacturing defendants but who (1) had been
occupationally exposed to asbestos products produced by a CCR defendant
or (2) was a spouse or family member so exposed. 33 Hundreds of thousands
of people, maybe millions, fit the description of the plaintiff class.34 The
complaint identified nine lead plaintiffs; five of the nine plaintiffs alleged
exposure to asbestos and a resulting injury, while the other four plaintiffs
alleged exposure only without any injury.35
The settlement agreement was extensive. The agreement proposed to
preclude all class members from pursuing lawsuits not filed prior to the
settlement. 36 In addition, the agreement detailed an administrative
mechanism that would compensate class members who met certain
predefined asbestos exposure requirements and certain medical criteria.37
Scheduled payments within a specified range of damages were to be made
depending on which of the four categories of compensable cancers and
nonmalignant conditions the claimant had suffered. 38 The settlement
provided for an "opt out" period which allowed class members to opt out
of the class and pursue their own individual actions so long as the class
members acted within three months after court-approved notice was sent.39
30 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294.
31 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626 n. l.
35 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
36 See id. at 2240.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Georgine, 878 F. Supp. at 720.
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There were also limited opt out provisions allowing a specified number of
class members to opt out yearly. 40 However, those members allowed to opt
out would forfeit any punitive damages claims or any claims for increased
risk of cancer. 41 Despite the constraints on the claimants, the settlement
permitted the CCR defendants to completely withdraw from the settlement
agreement after ten years.42
The settlement had other terms that appeared favorable to the CCR
defendants. First, the agreement did not adjust for inflation. Second, the
agreement capped the number of claims payable annually for each of the
four categories of diseases. 43 Third, the settlement denied certain claims
like loss of consortium and enhanced risk of cancer even though otherwise
applicable state law recognized those claims. 44 Finally, pleural claimants,
who represented more than half of all asbestos-related cases previously
filed, were also excluded. 45
The settlement also provided class members with certain benefits. The
settlement tolled the statute of limitations; therefore, any claim not time-
barred on the date of filing of the class action could be brought under the
settlement. 46 In addition, the settlement agreement provided that the CCR
defendants waived all defenses to liability.47 In the opinion of the district
court, the agreement also compensated the sick without long delays,
uncertainties and high transaction costs inherent in the tort system.48
Furthermore, the settlement gave claimants "come-back" rights which
allowed certain claimants to file a second claim and receive additional
compensation if the claimants proved they suffered a different, more
serious asbestos-related disease than the illness upon which their first claim
40 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2241.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 2240.
44 See id. at 2240-2241.
45 See id. "Pleural claims" are those claims for asbestos-related plaques which
develop on the lungs but are not accompanied by any physical impairment. See
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 620. For a more exhaustive discussion on the large proportion of
pleural claims weighing down court dockets, see generally Schuck, supra note 12.
46 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2240-2241.
47 See id.
48 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 316.
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was based.49
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 29, 1993, the district court conditionally certified the class
under Rule 23(b)(3). 50 The district court then enjoined class members from
separately filing any asbestos suits in a federal or state court.51 Upon appeal
to the Third Circuit, the district court's orders were vacated. 52
Relying on its earlier decision in In re GM Trucks,53 the Third Circuit
held that although a class could be formed for settlement only, the
certification requirements of Rule 23 had to be met as if the case were
going to be litigated.54 The Third Circuit looked at the language of Rule 23
and held that the settlement did not meet the requirements of the Rule.55
The Third Circuit found that the settlement in this case did not meet the
Rule 23 (b)(3) requirement that "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members." 56 The district court had wrongly concluded that the
"predominance" requirement was met because all class members had been
exposed to asbestos and all class members had a common interest in getting
prompt and fair compensation while minimizing transaction costs inherent
49 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2240-2241.
50 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D at 257.
51 See Georgine, 878 F. Supp. at 724.
52 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 635.
53 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
54 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626.
55 See id. at 624. To maintain a class action it must satisfy the four requisites of
Rule 23(a) and at least one of three requisites listed in Rule 23(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are: (1) numerosity (joinder of all members is
impracticable), (2) commonality (common questions of law or fact), (3) typicality
(claims or defenses are typical of the class) and (4) adequacy of representation
(representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class). See id. In
this case, the applicable Rule 23(b) requisite was predominance, which asks whether
"questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. Rule 23(c)
requires opt out notices to class members when a class action is maintained under Rule
23(b)(3). See id. Furthermore, Rule 23(e) requires court approval after notice for any
dismissal or compromise of a class action. See id.
56 Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626.
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in the asbestos litigation process. 57 The Third Circuit reasoned that class
members' claims varied in character because class members "were exposed
to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in
different ways, and over different periods."58 In addition, each class
member had a personal history of smoking which led to factual differences
resulting in significant legal differences such as causation, comparative fault
and types of damages available to each individual. 59 The CCR defendants
petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Third Circuit's decision and
certiorari was granted.6
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a six-person majority, held that
"settlement is relevant to a class certification,"61 and therefore courts need
not analyze a settlement as if it were going to be litigated. However, the
requirements of Rule 23, which are designed to protect absentee class
members from overbroad class definitions, "demand heightened attention in
the settlement context." 62 Indeed, in a footnote, Justice Ginsburg stated,
"proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less caution on
the question of certification." 63
The majority opinion analyzed the proposed class settlement in
accordance with the language of Rule 23. First, the Court dismissed the
district court's and the settling parties' contention that fairness of the
settlement predominates over diverse legal issues pivotal in litigation but
irrelevant as to settlement, thus satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). To the contrary,
the majority concluded that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
does not bear on whether the settlement benefits are fair; fairness is an
57 See id.; see also Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 316.
58 Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626.
59 See id.
60 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379, 379 (1996).
61Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2247. A proposed amendment to Rule 23
would authorize certification of settlement even though the requirements of (b)(3) are
not met for purposes of going to trial. See Proposed Amendment to FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b), 117 S. Ct. No. 1 CXIX, CLIV-CLV (Aug. 1996).
62 Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
63 Id. at 2248 n.16.
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additional, separate question under Rule 23(e). 64 The majority held that the
predominance test of Rule 23(b)(3) is not met by the benefits asbestos-
exposed persons gain from an administrative compensation scheme; rather,
the predominance inquiry contemplates whether the class is "sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." 65
The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the class was not similar
enough to warrant adjudication by representation. The nature of asbestos
exposure differed tremendously for each member: "class members were
exposed to different asbestos products, for different amounts of time, in
different ways, and over different periods." 66 Further, some members
suffered severe cancers or disabling asbestosis while others had yet to
suffer any physical impairments. 67 In addition, each member had different
histories of cigarette smoking which complicated causation issues.68 In the
end, the district court's certification was held invalid because it
misinterpreted the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement.
The Court also found, though not necessary to its holding, that the class
did not satisfy the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement that the named parties "will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 69 Relying on its
earlier decision in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez,70
the majority maintained that class representatives must be "part of the class
and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as other class
members." 71 Applying an analytical approach similar to the one the Court
used to scrutinize the predominance requirement, the majority stated that
64 See id. at 2249. The Court stated:
It is not the mission of Rule 23(e) to assure the class cohesion that legitimizes
representative action in the first place... If a common interest in a fair
compromise could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that
vital prescription would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement context.
Id.
65 Id. (citing 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1797 (2d ed. 1986)).
66 Id. at 2250.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 2250.
70 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
7 1 Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2250-2251 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)).
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the class was very diverse. Diversity of the class resulted in conflicts of
interests among the class. Those claimants with current injuries would want
generous, immediate payoffs. 72 On the other hand, those without an already
manifested injury would want an ample, "inflation-protected fund for the
future." 73 The settlement did not adjust for inflation; therefore, the
settlement favored the currently injured over the exposure-only plaintiffs. 74
In addition, although spouses of persons who were exposed to asbestos-
containing products were included in the class definition, loss of consortium
claims were precluded under the settlement.75 Ultimately, the Court found
that the global settlement did not provide adequate representation for the
diverse members in the class inflicted by asbestos-related injuries;
therefore, the settlement did not meet the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of
representation requirement.76
Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's basic
holding that "settlement is relevant to a class certification";77 however,
both would have remanded to the Third Circuit for review in light of this
holding instead of applying the holding to a cold record.78 Justice Breyer
explained,
[The majority reviews what are highly fact-based, complex, and difficult
matters, matters inappropriate for initial review before this
Court.... Indeed, the District Court's certification decision rests upon
more than 300 findings of fact reached after five weeks of comprehensive
hearings.... That [district] court is far more familiar with the issues and
litigants than is a court of appeals or are we, and therefore has 'broad
72 See id. at 2251.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 2241.
75 See id. at 2240.
76 See id. at 2251. The Court also highlighted that in other cases with diverse class
members, the classes were divided into subclasses. See id. (quoting In re Joint Eastern
and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-743 (2d Cir. 1992)). Perhaps if
the settling class members had formed subgroups and had been represented as such, the
class would have met the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation test. However,
subclass groupings would have fixed only the procedural aspect of adequacy of
representation. Had the provisions of the settlement been the same, subclass groupings
most likely could not have saved the intra-class conflicts regarding failure to adjust for
inflation and preclusion of loss of consortium claims.
77 Id. at 2252 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78 See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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power and discretion... with respect to matters involving the
certification' of class actions.79
Justice Breyer would have remanded to the Third Circuit for application
of the majority's holding that "settlement is relevant to class
certification. "80
V. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Products crushed any
possibility for most, if not all, mass tort class settlements, especially where
the class is partially made up of exposure-only members. Hardly any mass
tort classes will be able to meet the majority's interpretation of
predominance and adequacy of representation. However, the majority did
state that class action settlements may meet Rule 23 requirements in some
"consumer cases alleging securities fraud or violations of antitrust laws."81
The Supreme Court provided some guidance to district courts regarding
their roles in certifying a request for class settlement. Settlement is a factor
in deciding whether to certify a class; settlement neither weighs in favor of
granting certification, nor weighs in favor of denying certification. 82 In
addition, district courts should be wary of overbroad class definitions in the
settlement context because judges will be unable to adjust the class, as
would be possible during litigation pursuant to Rule 23(c) and (d).83 District
courts should decide whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to
warrant representative action, be it adjudication or representative
settlement.
The Supreme Court declined to answer two troublesome issues inherent
in class action settlements similar to that in Amchem Products: (1) attorney
conflicts of interest and (2) notice to future plaintiffs. In a footnote, the
Court stated that the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement
incorporates the adequacy and competency of class counsel. 84 The Court
declined to answer both issues because of its holding that other
79 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979)).
80 Id. at 2258 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81 Id. at 2250.
82 See id. at 2248 n.16.
83 See id. at 2248.
84 See id. at 2251 n.20.
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requirements of Rule 23 were not satisfied.
The first unanswered issue, adequacy of counsel, raises a multitude of
ethical questions. In Amchem Products, plaintiffs' attorneys represented
inventory plaintiffs85 prior to filing the class action on behalf of those who
had not yet filed lawsuits. In addition to filing a settlement on behalf of
people the plaintiffs' attorneys had never met, the plaintiffs' attorneys were
caught between client interests: negotiating a high settlement for those
plaintiffs with pending suits and getting a fair settlement for future
plaintiffs. In an Amchem Products-type situation, defendants may be willing
to offer high settlements for plaintiffs with pending claims in exchange for
favorable terms in the settlement agreement with future plaintiffs.8 6
Plaintiffs' attorneys get money immediately; in exchange, they give up
contingency fee contracts on future plaintiffs they may or may not get. On
the other side, defendants pay large settlements to a fixed number of known
plaintiffs, but are protected from huge judgments awarded to countless
numbers of unknown plaintiffs.
Rule 1.7(g) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that
when clients have interests that materially limit the lawyer's representation,
the lawyer must, based on a reasonable belief, determine that representation
of the client will not be adversely affected and obtain consent.87 In the
Amchem Products case, plaintiffs' attorneys negotiated settlement of
inventory claims concurrent with future claim settlement. 88 During these
negotiations, plaintiffs' attorneys represented both classes of plaintiffs.
However, the settlement agreements with inventory plaintiffs differed from
the settlement agreement reached for future plaintiffs: inventory claimants
with pleural thickening received settlement awards but future plaintiffs with
pleural thickening had no recourse under the settlement agreement.8 9 The
district court reconciled differences in settlement terms by citing high
85 Inventory plaintiffs are plaintiffs who had filed lawsuits prior to the filing of the
class action on behalf of future plaintiffs. See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2238.
The inventory plaintiffs' suits were consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257.
86 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. Rv. 1343, 1373-1374 (1995).
87 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7 (1993) [hereinafter
MODEL Ruis].
88 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
8 9 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266.
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transaction costs that future plaintiffs would not have to endure. 9° Pleural
claims make up a large proportion of asbestos claims and often lead to
substantial jury awards. 91 It seems that future plaintiffs received an inferior
or unequal settlement as compared to the inventory plaintiffs. Practically
speaking, plaintiffs' attorneys could not have met the Model Rule 1.7(g)
requirement of consent from future plaintiffs. The identity and number of
future plaintiffs were unknown by the plaintiffs' attorneys at the time they
took on representation. Although the plaintiffs' attorneys did not abide
strictly with Model Rule 1.7, maybe more leniency is necessary in special
circumstances such as settlement of future claims in mass tort cases,
especially considering the fact that consent from unknown plaintiffs is next
to impossible.
One commentator has recognized the potential for defendant auctioning
of settlement awards to the lowest plaintiffs' attorney bidder in situations
similar to that in Amchem Products.92 Teams of plaintiffs' attorneys with
then pending inventory claims must rush to settle their inventory claims
with the defendants in order to realize any benefits from being named lead
counsel in the settlement of future claims. 93 In effect, it is imperative that
an individual team of plaintiffs' attorneys act fast and concoct the best deal,
or in other words a deal more favorable to the defendants than that of their
plaintiffs' attorney competitors. Furthermore, class counsel representing
future claimants in a mass tort class action may have an incentive to advise
their clients not to opt out even though it would be in the best interest of
some clients to pursue their claim individually. 94 The plaintiffs' attorneys in
the Amchem Products settlement agreed to advise all future plaintiffs to
follow the guidelines set forth in the settlement agreement. 95 That
agreement flies in the face of Model Rule 5.6(b), which expressly prohibits
attorneys from agreeing to restrict their right to practice as a part of a
settlement. 96 In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys receive two fees: one fee as
90 See id.
91 See Schuck, supra note 12, at 562-563.
92 See Coffee, supra note 86, at 1373.
93 See id. at 1372. In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys must act fast because class
actions may be filed in state courts by fellow plaintiffs' attorneys, adjudication of which
is binding on absent plaintiffs. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811
(1982).
94 See Coffee, supra note 86, at 1375.
95 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 300.
96 See MODEL RuLEs 5.6(b). For a detailed discussion of MODEL RuLE 5.6, see
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class counsel and another fee as the representative of the class member
filing claims under the compensation scheme of the class action.97 In
Amchem Products, plaintiffs' attorneys had ample opportunity to act
unethically. The Supreme Court should have given lower courts some
guidance on this difficult issue.
Another related issue is whether federal standards of ethics are imposed
in federal court or whether state rules governing attorney conduct govern in
federal court. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that attorney
ethics are governed by state rules,98 the district court in Amchem Products
considered ethical conduct in the federal courts to be governed by federal
standards. 99 In global class settlements on behalf of future claimants, Erie
issues may arise in applying ethical rules governing lawyer behavior. 1°°
Attorney ethics is a difficult issue, especially in the context of the
settlement of mass torts.
The other question the Court declined to answer was that of notice. 10 1
The notice in Amchem Products consisted of hundreds of thousands of
individual notices, a television and print advertisement campaign and
initiatives by domestic and international unions to notify their members of
the lawsuit. 102 In dicta, the Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit
that notice was inadequate because the class definition was so sprawling.103
Some of the class members may not know they have been exposed to
asbestos products. 104 Assuming this to be the case, such people, although
receiving technical notice, could not have appreciated the fact that the
notice applied to them. Furthermore, future spouses or future family
members exposed by their mates or parent to asbestos-containing products
would have no reason to understand that they fit the description of a class
member mentioned in the notice. The Supreme Court suggested that no
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, at 1167.
97 See Coffee, supra note 86, at 1375.
98 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-167 (1986).
99 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 326.
100 For a more complete discussion of Erie issues, see generally Richard Marcus,
They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858
(1995).
101 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2252.
102 See id. at 2257 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103 See id. at 2252.
104 See id.
762
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. V. WINDSOR
constitutional notice could be given to a class similar to the Amchem
Products class.10 5
In addition to notice and attorney ethics, the Supreme Court gave little
guidance to district court judges regarding the fairness inquiry of Rule
23(e). Although the Court distinguished the Rule 23(e) fairness inquiry
from the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, the distinction is very
difficult to make. 106 According to the Court, Rule 23(e) "protects unnamed
class members from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when
the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or
are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claim." 107 In Amchem
Products, the Court never said that the fairness test was met. The Court
only hinted that "a common interest in a fair compromise" may satisfy the
fairness test. 108 Assuming that mass tort class action settlement is possible,
how is a district court judge to decide what is fair? Settlement-only class
actions are unique because the district court judge is being asked by present
parties to certify a class to bind absent parties for the benefit of the present
parties making the request. 109
In the Amchem Products case, it was nearly impossible to identify the
total number of people who would be inflicted in the future with asbestos-
related illnesses; thus, the district court judge bound an unknown number of
absent parties to the agreement for the benefit of the CCR defendants and
the small number of representative plaintiffs. The Amchem Products
settlement provided for strict "case flow maximums" that limited the
amount of claims payable in a given year. If the number of those stricken
with asbestos-related cancers was extremely high in a given year, or in a
given span of years, some claimants would then have to wait a long time
for recovery. Although long recovery delays are the norm in the tort
system, 110 at least the cancer-inflicted plaintiff has a better chance for a
higher damages award in litigation. In addition, because the agreement did
not adjust for inflation, case flow maximums could effectively reduce the
total recovery in real dollars for those plaintiffs who develop injuries well
105 See id.
106 See id. at 2249.
107 Id. (quoting 7A CHARLEs ALAN WIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRocmuRE § 1797 (2d ed. 1986)).
108 See id.
109 See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 840.
110 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 619.
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into the future. There are many such problems that face the district courts
in determining fairness; the inability to approximate the total number of
people that fit the class description is only one uncertainty that makes a
fairness inquiry difficult for a district court judge. The goal of a broad-
based settlement of asbestos-related claims is admirable. Under an
administrative claims mechanism, those afflicted with asbestos-related
injuries are guaranteed some recovery without the risk of having to prove
liability. In addition, a settlement like Amchem Products provides security
that funds will be available into the future. Certainly, the burden of
asbestos litigation lifted from the federal dockets would free up valuable
time for resolution of other pending cases. Until legislative action, the only
way to recognize the merits of a global class settlement is to scrutinize the
alternative-individual lawsuits. Individual pursuit of asbestos claims
extracts a severe penalty on the parties most in need of a resolution, those
inflicted with asbestos-related diseases. Long delays to recovery are
routine, trials are exhaustively long, transaction costs exceed victim's
recovery by almost two to one and future claimants may get nothing.'
VI. CONCLUSION
In Amchem Products, the Supreme Court appeared to effectively end
any chances that the class action device will be viable in the future for
settlement of mass tort claims involving variable exposure to toxic
substances. The Supreme Court held that settlement is relevant to
certification of a class under Rule 23. However, a class must still be
certified for settlement; therefore, certain requirements of Rule 23 demand
heightened attention in order to protect the rights of future claimants.
Although the Court's application of Rule 23 to the Amchem Products
settlement was based on sound reasoning and public policy, the Court failed
to provide any solution to the problem. In the body of the Court's opinion,
the Court stated that a Judicial Conference of the United States urged
Congress to pass an administrative claims procedure similar to the Black
Lung legislation, but Congress failed to act.112 Although the Court struck
down the Amchem Products settlement as not meeting the requirements of
Rule 23, the Court offered no opinion on how the settlement could have
Ill See id.
112 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2238.
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been crafted in order to be acceptable. 113 As Justice Breyer suggested, the
Court could have given the settlement agreement a chance on remand.
114
The Court found one solution to the asbestos-litigation problem
unacceptable; however, the Court did not offer a better solution.
Marc T. Kamer
113 In September of this year, the Judicial Conference of the United States
approved an amendment to Rule 23, Rule 23(f), permitting appeal of a trial court's
decision to certify or deny certification. See Immediate Appeal of Class Action
Certification Decision Would Be Allowed Under Proposed Change to Federal Rule 23,
66 U.S.L.W. 2177, 2177 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1997) (No. 97-12). In addition, a proposed
Rule 23(b)(4) which permits certification of class settlements will be discussed by the
Judicial Conference this October. See id. The draft Advisory Committee Note to the
proposed amendment is as follows:
New subdivision (b)(4) authorizes certification of a (b)(3) class for purposes of
settlement. It requires that all of the subdivision (a) prerequisites for class
certification be met, and that the predominance and superiority requirements of
(b)(3) also be met. But it authorizes evaluation of these prerequisites and
requirements from the perspective of settlement. A settlement class may be
certified even though the same class would not be certified for purposes of
litigation. Although (b)(4) is set out as a separate paragraph, the class is certified
under (b)(3) and is subject to the rights of notice and exclusion that apply to all
(b)(3) classes. Certification is permitted only on motion by parties to a settlement
agreement already reached. The separate subdivision (e) requirements for notice of
settlement and court approval continue to apply.
Memorandum from Patrick E. Higginbetham, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Committee of Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Report of the Advisory Comm. of Civil Rules, 117 S. Ct.
329, 331 (May 17, 1996). The Advisory Committee decided to wait until after the
Court issued Amnchem Products in order to continue discussion on the proposed
amendment. See id. The proposed rule and the Court's decision are strikingly
similar.114 See Amchem Products, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.

